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Abstract 
 
Canada’s political and juridical spheres have transformed post 9/11. Borrowing from the analytic 
framework of Michel Foucault, Giorgio Agamben and Jacques Derrida, I will examine these 
transformations philosophically and sociologically. One of the aims of this essay is to dispel 
liberal views that maintain that emergency rule is aberrational; on the contrary, I argue that 
emergency rule is part of the ‘normal juridical order’.  Another aim of this essay is to analyze how 
a perceived crisis shapes the modus operandi of the state and law. The third aim of this essay is to 
show how state power works under emergency rule. In terms of the former and latter, I will focus 
on the power the state has to produce ‘bare life’ and rogue states. Finally, this essay will examine 
the case of Mr. Maher Arar to illustrate the intellectual and material significance of these 
transformations in Canada. 
 
Introduction 
Maher Arar is a Syrian born Canadian engineer who was traveling back to Canada from a family 
vacation in Tunisia in September 2002.  He was apprehended by the United States government 
while transiting through JFK airport back to Canada.  He was detained and interrogated by FBI 
and INS officers; twelve days later, he was deported to Syria.  In Syria, he was jailed (under 
substandard living conditions), tortured and interrogated for ten months.  Syrian authorities 
exonerated him of all connections to terrorism and he was discharged into Canadian custody 
(Meerpol 2005: 60). 
In October 2001, Canada developed Project A-O in response to 9/11.  Canadian police 
(RCMP) and intelligence (CSIS) began meeting with an FBI agent about the Almalki 
investigation (Government of Canada 2006: 85).  These organizations would share intelligence 
and information as a result of 9/11.  The catalyst of their relationship transpired when Mr.  Arar’s 
computer was confiscated by Canada Customs in December 2001 (Government of Canada 2006: 
85).    
According to the Arar inquiry, Project A-O sent misinformation to U.S. intelligence, 
which distorted Mr. Arar’s travel record and his unwillingness to cooperate with Canadian 
intelligence and law enforcement.  In terms of the former, for instance, Mr.  Arar was suspected 
of being near Washington, D. C. on September 11, 2001.  In terms of the latter, it was alleged that 
Mr.  Arar declined to be interviewed in January 2002 and that he abruptly left Canada for Tunisia 
(Government of Canada 2006: 28). Both allegations are false.  Mr. Arar was not near 
Washington, D.C. on September 11, 2001.  Next, Mr. Arar did not oppose the interview request.  
Another point to clarify, Mr. Arar did not depart from Canada immediately after the interview 
request; he departed five months later.  Despite the allegations, there is no evidence he left earlier 
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(Government of Canada 2006: 28).  Based on the allegations about Mr. Arar, we can appreciate 
why the RCMP and U.S. intelligence was interested in developing an investigation on Mr. Arar. 
Notwithstanding Project A-Os’ case against Mr. Arar, they failed to include a caveat to their 
respective allegations against Mr. Arar (Government of Canada 2006: 28).  
 Project A-O continued with its investigation on Mr. Arar, there were suspicions that he 
might be associated with Al-Qaeda. The basis of this suspicion rests on the fact that Mr. Arar had 
contact with individuals of interest to Project A-O.  For example, Mr. Arar had contact with Mr. 
Almalki; there is evidence that the two met at Mango’s Café in October 2001 (Government of 
Canada 2006: 160).  There was no definitive association between Mr. Arar and Al-Qaeda, 
however (Government of Canada 2006: 160). 
 The point to distill from the forgoing account is that when Mr. Arar landed at JFK airport, 
U.S. intelligence was particularly interested in apprehending him for questioning. U.S. 
intelligence seized Canadian intelligence on Mr. Arar; they were determined not to risk any 
mistakes, which according to their rationale, could lead to another September 11, 2001, or worse 
(Government of Canada 2006: 160).  Once Mr. Arar was apprehended by U.S. officials, Canadian 
intelligence was marginalized from an active role in the investigation to a more passive, 
secondary role.  The latter can be appreciated through the example that it was the U.S. that 
decided that Mr. Arar would be transferred to Syria not Canada.  For some time, Canadian 
intelligence had no knowledge on the whereabouts of Mr. Arar (Government of Canada 2006: 
180).  
 By October 2002, CSIS officials were aware that the United States probably had rendered 
Mr. Arar to a country, in which, he could be questioned.  The case of Mr. Arar highlights a 
particular practice that the U.S. engages in when they cannot legally detain a terrorist suspect, or 
wish to question a suspect; they render the individual in question to a country willing to execute 
this task (Government of Canada 2006: 245). This practice, which emerged post 9/11, is called 
rendition (Government of Canada 2006: 245).  The Arar inquiry found that CSIS knew that Mr. 
Arar was removed from the United States to be tortured and interrogated for the purposes of 
extracting information about him and his so called connections with Al-Qaeda (Government of 
Canada 2006: 245).  
 Mr. Arar’s case highlights a unique strategy in the way that investigations have shifted 
from traditional prosecution investigations to preventative investigations (Government of Canada 
2006: 75).  Mr. Arar’s case embodies the latter, both Canadian and American intelligence were 
interested in him because their evidence loosely suggested he might be connected to Al-Qaeda.  
Pursuing preventative investigations is difficult because failure to do so may result in a terrorist 
attack; however, following through may lead to innocent people being detained indefinitely, 
tortured, interrogated or killed.   
Mr. Arar’s case raises dire questions at this historical juncture of post 9/11.  As a result, I 
seek to conceptualize an inclusive and expansive understanding of the complexities in the 
interplay of the state, law and life. I am interested in exploring how a perceived crisis can shape 
the contours of state and law practices.  Specifically, I am concerned about how emergency rule 
impacts domestic targeted groups (Arabs, Muslims and South East Asians or those that are 
deemed to physically or culturally resemble said groups).  I am also interested in the interplay of 
sovereignty, law and rogue states; namely, Afghanistan and Iraq.  This essay will concentrate on 
current state practices of the U.S. and Canada; however, more emphasis will be allocated to 
Canada. 
The literature review of this essay will explore the claims of Jacques Derrida, Michel 
Foucault and Giorgio Agamben, on issues pertaining to sovereignty, law, life and rogue states.  
One of the goals of this literature review is to uncoil some philosophical and sociological tensions 
relating to the state and law. In doing so, I will address a number of provisional points: (1) to 
critically examine the formation of these concepts and to juxtapose what they are designed to do, 
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(ideal) versus some problems in their current practice; (2) to develop and extend the theoretical 
and material significance of the state and law at this particular juncture of post 9/11.  
Sovereignty and law were designed to protect citizens from foreign invasion and violence 
among each other (Hobbes 1651/1996; Locke 1689/1996).  In the post 9/11 world, liberal views 
on sovereignty and law maintain that the two have breached their contract of protection; this view 
perceives this breach as an anomaly or as temporary. Postmodern and Post Structrualists, on the 
other hand, reject the latter position and show that the suspension of law and the states’ inversion 
from so-called protection is part and parcel of sovereign power and juridical order (Benjamin 
1978; Foucault 1979; Butler 2004; Agamben 2005; Derrida 2005).  Drawing from the tradition of 
Derrida, Foucault and Agamben, I will try to demonstrate how sovereign power manifests in the 
context of a perceived crisis; its complex structure during emergency rule, and I will address the 
problems pertaining to its practices in relation to life and rogue states. 
The key argument is that in a crisis, it is through the suspension of law and use of 
military and police violence that order is established (Agamben 2005).  Here, the state is able to 
ensure its survival and pursue economic and political control through violence, which is 
legitimated by the law.  In a crisis or exceptional circumstances, the state and law have little 
regard for the lives of targeted citizens and/or targeted nation states.  The latter therefore, reveals 
the power state and law have over some citizens and some nation states.  
What can be deduced from the above perspective is that sovereign power needs to be 
hierarchized in terms of strong state and rogue states (Derrida 2005).  It also needs to be 
contextualized, for the ‘rule of the strongest’ materializes under conditions of perceived threats or 
in the name of a cause, for example, humanitarian intervention, terrorism, national security and so 
forth. In this vein, it is the ‘strongest’ state that is the sovereign (in relation to the smaller 
sovereigns) and it is able to impose its violence and discourses of democracy and rule of law on 
so called rogue states (Derrida 2005; Chomsky 2005).   
 
Section 1: The Base: Early views on Sovereignty and law 
 
Thomas Hobbes argues that the ‘state of nature’ is characterized by perpetual fear and peril.  
Hobbes’ solution to the drudgery of living in a state of nature was to seek collective peace and 
safety.  The latter would provide protection from foreign and local invasion.  It would also 
provide people security and enable them to live contentedly; Hobbes suggests that people confer 
their power and strength upon one man1 or an assembly of men2 (Hobbes 1651/1996: 650).  The 
people will appoint one man or an assembly of men to embody their will to ensure the common 
peace and safety, this is also known as the social contract.  The former and latter encapsulate 
what Hobbes means by the ‘Leviathan’ (state) and what it is designed to do.  
 Hobbes informs us that the Leviathan can be established in two ways; first, by resorting 
to violence/force: as when a government subdues a foe, the subdued party either submits to the 
will of victorious government or is killed; second, when men agree amongst themselves, to 
submit to some man or assembly of men.  The latter is done voluntarily; the rationale here is for 
protection (Hobbes 1651/1996: 651).  According to Hobbes, citizens are not allowed to oppose 
the Leviathan. The only occasion when a citizen can oppose the Leviathan is when a citizens’ life 
is in peril. 
John Locke characterizes the state of nature as having plenty of resources and people are 
equal and free.  For the most part, Locke maintains that people are not evil, conniving, and self-
centered.  Rather, people in a state of nature get along; however, there is potential for conflict 
when someone attempts to infringe on the life, health, property or well being of another.  
Inequalities are the by-product of these conflicts (Locke 1689/1996: 741).  Locke concurs with 
Hobbes in that the Leviathan is inevitable; however, he calls it ‘Civil Society’ (state and law) 
(Locke 1689/1996: 766).  
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 According to Locke, the role of the state is not only to protect the lives of its citizens, but 
also their lifestyles and property (Locke 1689/1996: 741).  Locke elaborates on four functions of 
the state, including legislative power (right to make laws, particularly, property rights); executive 
power (right to enforce laws); defense power (right to protect members from foreign invaders); 
and the obligation to respect the public good (cannot make laws that infringe on individuals 
public rights) (Locke 1996: 1689/778-779).  If the sovereign fails to fulfill these duties, Locke 
reserves to citizens the right to elect a new sovereign.  This can only be achieved through the law; 
the sovereign should not be overthrown through violence (Locke 1689/1996: 815).  
The main points from Hobbes and Locke are that they both promoted the development of 
the state and law to alleviate and arguably, to improve the living conditions of humans.  
According to both Hobbes and Locke, the formation of the state and law was designed to protect 
and maintain order.  In this vein, the interests of the common are protected from local and foreign 
invasion.   
What neither author asked or foresaw however, is what happens if the state uses the law 
against its citizens?  More directly, these authors failed to consider how the state could use the 
law to coerce, appropriate assets, kill and engage in practices of rendition. Rendering targeted 
bodies to foreign countries will likely result in practices of torture, interrogation and violation of 
human rights.  The state can engage in such abominable practices to ensure that a particular order 
is established or maintained.  They failed to see that if the state is confronted with peril, it will 
endeavor to prevail at all costs; the legal apparatus is the guiding tool that ensures the life and 
security of the state.  These theorists did not consider the state of nature that can emerge between 
the state and some citizens. They also did not consider the power and control the state has over its 
citizens precisely because the state affords them protection.  In other words, Hobbes and Locke 
did not inquire into the possibility that the state could strip citizens of the rights it guarantees 
them. The authors in the next section address the latter issues.  
 
Section 2: Post-Structuralist Debates on Sovereignty & law 
 
Recent scholars such as Carl Schmitt, delineate the complex relationship between sovereignty and 
law in the context of a crisis.  Schmitt postulates that the sovereign is he who decides (Schmitt 
1934/2005: 5).  This suggests that the sovereign is able to rule independent of legal restrictions 
and public support if there is an emergency at hand.  For Schmitt, the sovereign must not only 
decide if there is an emergency, but must also decide how to effectively address it (Schmitt 
1934/2005: 7).  From this thesis, one can infer two important points; first, the state suspends the 
law (normal civil order) if it perceives a threat (Schmitt 1934/2005: 12).  Second, the sovereign 
has the ‘monopoly to decide’ (Schmitt 1934/2005: 13).  Schmitt writes, “Although he stands 
outside the normally valid legal system, he nevertheless belongs to it, for it is he who must decide 
whether the constitution needs to be suspended in its entirety” (Schmitt 1934/2005: 7). 
 Schmitt’s analysis indicates that state power can do as it pleases to ensure its survival 
against “others” who pose an imminent life or death threat.  Schmitt’s position suggests that the 
rule of law can be suspended; that authoritarian and perhaps, inhumane measures may be 
indispensable to ward off threats and imminent catastrophes (Schmitt 1934/2005).  According to 
Schmitt, the state and exception are intimately connected and it is the latter that affirms the 
existence of the former.  On this point, Schmitt writes, “The rule proves nothing; the exception 
proves everything: it confirms not only its rule but also its existence, which derives only from the 
exception” (Schmitt 1934/2005: 15). 
Michel Foucault’s analysis of state power, however, challenges the views of Schmitt.  
Foucault theorizes that sovereign power is concerned with sophisticated technologies of 
discipline and regulation of the body.  The Leviathan perspective of the sovereign was 
underscored by its power over life: to kill or let live.  Foucault writes, “The old power of death 
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that symbolized sovereign power was now carefully supplanted by the administration of bodies 
and the calculated management of life” (Foucault 1990: 140). 
   He elaborates on this shift by framing sovereign power as “biopower.”  Biopower has 
two characteristics, first, to discipline the body; second, to regulate the population (Foucault 
1990: 139).  Disciplining the body refers to making the body useful yet docile, and to its 
‘integration into systems of efficient controls.’  Both the latter and former features of biopower 
are subject to ‘intervention and regulatory control’ (Foucault 1990:139).   
Therefore, the shift in sovereign power and rule should not be misinterpreted to suggest 
that concepts and practices of sovereignty and law are ‘progressing,’ in terms of providing 
security and protection to all.  In this way, Foucault defies liberal views on sovereignty and law.  
Unlike Hobbes or Locke, Foucault argues that the development of sovereignty and law represent 
sophisticated techniques of regulation and social ordering. Foucault (1995: 169) writes “…Its 
fundamental reference was not the primal social contract, but to permanent coercions, not to 
fundamental rights, but to indefinitely progressive forms of training, not to the general will but to 
automatic docility.”   
 To sum up, Schmitt characterized state power as being able to resort to violence to ensure 
maintenance or establish political and social order.  In contrast, Foucault’s analysis explores 
various technologies of power linked to the sovereign to ensure social control and regulation.  
These strategies are not permanently coercive; instead, they are disciplinary and target the soul 
not the body of the population.    
Giorgio Agamben’s book, State of Exception (2005), theorizes on the capacity of state 
power to suspend due process, while abandoning its citizens to violence, detention and torture.  In 
times of emergency, the executive is able to suspend the normal juridical order and invoke the 
military apparatus to address the so-called emergency; Agamben refers to the latter as the ‘state 
of exception.’  Agamben’s work resonates with Schmitt’s work in that it demonstrates the 
complexities of the role of state; both highlight the ability the state has to be bound to the normal 
juridical order and yet be able to step outside of it (during a crisis) to restore order.  The latter 
suggests that the modus operandi of the state is dependent on the context.  Therefore, the 
sovereign is tied to the law as much as it is not (Agamben 1998/2005: 15; Schmitt 2005).  
Agamben postulates that the prevalence of the state of exception should not be perceived 
as an anomaly or temporary; but rather, as constituting modern state power. Agamben’s analysis 
of the state of exception is tied to the “camp” (1995/1998: 166-167). For Agamben, the 
concentration camp is no anomaly or anarchism; instead, it is the highest manifestation of 
sovereign power over life.  The camp is thus a zone of exception, outside normal juridical order.  
Agamben demonstrates this point by highlighting how the camp was pervasive throughout World 
War 1 and 2 (Agamben 1998: 167).  According to Agamben, the camp is a space that opens when 
the state of exception unfolds and becomes the rule.  Agamben warns that during times of 
indefinite emergency, the camp is rendered with a permanent spatial arrangement.  The 
significance of the camp for Agamben is that it is the site whereby the sovereign materializes 
tactics of interrogation that would otherwise be condemned by domestic and international legal 
protocols.  Agamben writes, “Whoever entered the camp moved in a zone of indistinction 
between outside and inside, exception and rule, licit and illicit, in which the very concepts of 
subjective right and juridical protection no longer made any sense” (Agamben 1998: 170). 
Agamben theorizes that the camp is the highest manifestation of biopolitics in the context 
of the state of exception.  Those detained in connection with the war on terrorism are subject to 
torture, violation of human rights, deprived of domestic and international rights, forced to live 
under subhuman conditions and so forth.  Their lives are in the hands of legal and military 
officials who run these camps.  Their lifestyles are coordinated and monitored by agents of law 
enforcement and/or military officers. Therefore, in the camp, the normal legal order is suspended; 
the possibility of atrocities occurring depends not on the law, but on the civility and military 
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officers who act as sovereigns of the camp (Agamben 1998: 174).  Agamben captures how the 
camp is an expression of biopolitics, Agamben writes,  
 
The camp was also the most absolute biopolitical space ever to have been realized, in 
which power confronts nothing but pure life, without any mediation.  This is why the 
camp is the very paradigm of political space at the point at which politics becomes 
biopolitics and homo sacer is virtually confused with citizen. (Agamben 1998: 171) 
 
Individuals in the camp are referred to as homo sacer.  Agamben conceptualizes homo sacer as an 
individual who is reduced to ‘bare life’, denied legal provisions; homo sacer is a person that can 
be killed without committing homicide (Agamben 1998: 183).  Two points follow from here: 
first, the impunity of killing homo sacer; second, killing homo sacer implies that the violence 
done, does not constitute a sacrilege (Agamben 1998: 82). Therefore, under a state of exception 
and in the zone of the camp, homo sacer may be killed but not sacrificed; the death of homo sacer 
is with impunity. 
 Homo sacer’s vulnerability in the camp demonstrates the biopolitical power the 
sovereign has over life under a state of emergency or crisis.  Homo sacer is subject to sovereign 
power, which decides the continuity of life or the death of homo sacer. The act of killing homo 
sacer demonstrates the politicalization of life through the very capacity the sovereign has to 
produce and kill homo sacer (Agamben 1998: 89).  
 Another important concept that Agamben emphasizes is the “ban” (1995/1998:109-110).  
The ban relates to the state of exception, homo sacer and the camp. Agamben delineates that 
whoever has been banned is at the mercy of the one who abandons him/her; this person is 
excluded from the normal juridical order and is incorporated into the zone of sovereign power 
under a state of exception (Agamben 1998: 110).  Agamben captures the interplay of state of 
exception, homo sacer and biopolitics, this way  
 
If it is the sovereign who, insofar as he decides on the state of exception, has the power to 
decide which life may be killed without the commission of homicide, in the age of 
biopolitics this power becomes emancipated from the state of exception and transformed 
into the power to decide the point at which life ceases to be politically relevant. 
(Agamben 1998: 142) 
 
Derrida’s book, Rogues (2005), explains how power works in relation to sovereignty and law.  He 
uses the term ipseity to refer to sovereign power. Ipseity articulates the rationale of the sovereign, 
which he views as a rationale of “I can”, or the “power that gives itself its own law, its force of 
law” (Derrida 2005: 11).  The latter speaks to the sovereign’s ability (because it can) to impose 
through force/violence and rule of law.  Derrida views the representation of the sovereign as 
having a peculiar bias; for him, the sovereign represents the rationale and interests of the 
‘strongest.’  The sovereign can enforce its desired rule through force, which is legitimized by law.  
Derrida writes, “There is no sovereignty without force, without the force of the strongest, whose 
reason - the reason of the strongest - is to win out over (avoir raison de) everything” (Derrida 
2005: 101).    
 Derrida narrates how sovereign power works generally; however, he focuses specifically, 
on U.S. sovereignty, which he claims is not constrained by international law.  In this way, the 
U.S. is the strongest for it cannot be restrained by other sovereign powers, domestic law or 
international law.  On a global level then, it can be argued that Derrida’s notion of ipseity is 
unfolding, for U.S. sovereign will is being enacted through violence and force.  U.S. sovereignty 
is able to fulfill its desires, while undermining international law, violating war and detainee 
arrangements and so forth (Derrida 2005). For Derrida then, U.S. sovereignty is might that makes 
right through violence, force and law (Derrida 2005: 22). 
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Derrida is critical of the claim that the ‘reason of the strongest’ imposes democracy 
through force.  His critique is based on the notion that democracy is inaccessible to all and so, in 
the case of a ‘rogue state’, democracy can only be accessed through the medium of the strongest, 
which relies on force of law and violence (Derrida 2005: 71-72).  Therefore, according to 
Derrida, the strongest decide who the rogue state is, and the accessibility and contours of 
“democracy” that will be imposed.  It is the strongest (political elite groups) that is able to impose 
democracy and their rule of law to eradicate networks of terrorism.  On this point, Derrida writes,  
 
To speak democratically of democracy, it would be necessary through some circular 
performativity and through the political violence of some enforcing rhetoric, some force 
of law, to impose a meaning on the word democratic and thus produce a consensus that 
one pretends, by fiction, to be established and accepted – or at the very least possible and 
necessary: on the horizon. (Derrida 2005: 73) 
 
Derrida’s deconstructs the term “voyou” (rogue), which the strongest uses to legitimate 
intervention and war.  Derrida writes, “The quality “voyou” is always precisely an attribution, the 
predicate or categoria and thus, the accusation leveled not against something natural but against 
an institution” (Derrida 2005: 79).  Derrida elaborates on the term “voyou” and addresses the 
connotation and implications the word has; specifically, a type of denunciation, accusation or a 
charge.  In this way, the word sets up a platform that, inevitably leads to, or prepares to, 
legitimatize some type of reprisal (social, political, economic, for example) (Derrida 2005: 79).  
Derrida writes, “The Etat voyou must be punished, contained rendered harmless, reduced to a 
harmless state, if need be by the force of law (droit) and the right (droit) of force” (Derrida 2005: 
79).  
The significance of Derrida’s analysis here, is to show that the reason of the strongest is 
able to designate or accuse a state as being rogue and use force to tackle the perceived threat 
(Derrida 2005: 80).  Another crucial point is the intimate relationship between being officially 
designated a rogue state and force of law, Derrida writes,  
 
A horse can be called rogue when it stops acting as it is supposed to, as it is expected to, 
for example as a race horse or a trained hunting horse.  A distinguishing sign is thus 
affixed to it, a badge or hood, to mark its status as rogue.  This last point marks the point 
rather well; indeed, it brands it, for the qualification rogue calls for marking or branding 
classification that sets something apart.  A mark of infamy discriminates by means of a 
first banishing or exclusion that then leads to a bringing before the law (Derrida 2005: 
93-94). 
 
Being labeled a rogue state therefore, needs to be situated in the context of who has the 
power and ability to confer such a negative label.  Not all sovereign states have the ability to 
designate another state as rogue and follow through with military, political and economic 
sanctions.  The charge of being called a rogue could mean that the strongest will resort to force, 
violence and law to address a perceived threat.  
 Derrida uses historical analysis to deepen and contextualize his claims. Specifically, he 
reminds us of how American administrations have been denouncing rogue states for a couple of 
decades (Cuba 1963–2008; Panama 1980s, Iraq 1990–2006, North Korea 1980s-2008, Libya 
1980s–2003); these states have been accused of disrespecting their obligation as a state before 
domestic and international law (Derrida 2005: xiii).  As a result of being called a rogue state, 
these nation states have experienced military, political and economic sanctions by the rule and 
reason of the strongest: the United States of America. 
 The above literature review has shed light on the complex structure of the state and law in 
relation to producing ‘bare life’ and rogue states in times of a perceived crisis. For Schmitt, the 
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state is able to suspend normal civil law and resort to violence to maintain or establish 
sociopolitical order.  On the other hand, for Foucault, the power of the state relates to the 
administration and regulation of the public.  It is concerned with acquiring knowledge about the 
activities of the population, which is inseparable from disciplining them.  Agamben explores the 
working of the state of exception as a biopolitical apparatus and asks how its practices affect 
targeted bodies.  Derrida’s deconstruction of the state and its use of law in the context of a crisis 
highlight how the ‘reason and rule of the strongest’ prevails through the use of violence and force 
of law.  More broadly, however, the analysis of Agamben and Derrida illustrates the unfettered 
power the state has to produce ‘bare life’ and rogue states under emergency rule.  
 
Section Two: Analysis and Critical Reflections 
 
This section will analyze the contributions of (1) Agamben and (2) Derrida.  The goal is to 
theorize how state and law power manifest under emergency rule.    
 
(1) Agamben’s analysis disputes liberal views, which separate normal juridical order from 
emergency, with the latter being on the basis of a crisis, which is deemed to warrant exceptional 
measures.  This liberal framework assumes that emergency rule is aberrational; however, far from 
being outside the rule of law, emergency powers are underwritten in legal structure—it is through 
law that violent actions during so called crises, have been legitimated (Neocleous: 2006: 206-207; 
Agamben 2005; Hussain 2003). More directly, no constitution exists that does not contain 
provisions for emergency rule. Therefore, state violence is entrenched in the daily activities of 
state practices, the state works from within the law rather than against the law; both are part of a 
consolidated political strategy in the production and/or maintenance of social and political order.   
A criticism of Agamben’s work, however, is that his literature review is based on states 
of exception in Europe; these states of exception were temporary or episodic (for example, Nazi 
Germany, France 1924, Switzerland 1914 and so forth (Agamben 2005: 12, 14, 16).  In contrast, 
the state of exception has been the reality for racialized, colonialized people, women and ethnic 
groups, all of whom only know one rule; specifically, the state of exception and the camp.  For 
example, Pakistan from 1977–1985 and 2006; Chile 1973; Peru 1981; South Africa apartheid; 
Zambia 1964–1991 and so on highlight the ubiquity of the state of exception and the camp.  The 
latter therefore, challenges Agamben’s view that there has been a paradigm shift in modern nation 
states (Agamben 2005).  One could ask a shift for whom?  Would racialized people perceive the 
so-called ubiquity of the state of exception as a novelty?  My critique is reinforced by Benjamin, 
who writes, “The tradition of the oppressed teaches us that the “state of emergency” in which we 
live is not only the exception but the rule” (Benjamin 1940/2003: 392). 
Another limitation of Agamben’s work is that his analysis does not look at how issues of 
race, gender and sexuality intersect with state power and the production of bare life.  The latter 
has been addressed by Jasbir K. Puar.  Her analysis looks at how current state practices protect 
some queer subjects while abandoning racialized groups such as Arabs, Muslims or those that 
resemble their physical, religious and/or cultural practices. Puar argues that the inclusion of some 
queer subjects depends on the production of ‘Orientalized’ terrorist bodies, which are excluded 
from state and legal protection (Puar 2007).  The implication is that the inclusion of queer 
subjects, which she refers to as ‘homonationalisms’ are utilized as a technique to distinguish 
between different categories of citizenship.  On the one hand, there is the category of ‘properly 
heterosexuals’ and also ‘properly homosexuals.’  These two categories are considered as U.S. 
patriots.  On the other hand, terrorist look-alikes such as, Muslims, Arab and Sikhs, whom are 
sexualized and racialized are consequently, abandoned by the state and subject to detention and 
deportation (Puar 2007).  Therefore, the nuance of Puar’s work is that it looks at the way race, 
gender and sexuality shape state knowledge, which informs its practices of distinguishing 
citizenship, subjection to violence, detention and deportation of Arabs, Muslims and/or those that 
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resemble the physical and cultural characteristics of said groups.  Further elaboration of Puar’s 
work is relevant; however, it is beyond the scope of this academic endeavor.  
Notwithstanding some troubles with Agamben’s analysis, his work demonstrates the 
complex relationship between sovereignty and law.  His work also addresses the ubiquity of the 
state of exception—this can suggest that a new paradigm of government is unfolding for all.  The 
above analysis, forces us to rethink traditional orthodoxies surrounding the nation state, 
sovereignty and law and its relation to the production of bare life and rogue states.    
 
(2) A number of important conclusions can be inferred from Derrida’s analysis of sovereign 
power and law.  First, sovereign rule is intrinsically problematic because it reflects the reason of 
the strongest.  Two, the rationality of ipseity is problematic because it reveals the power 
imbalance that exists between the interests of the state and the public (Derrida 2005).  Namely, 
the state can do as it pleases because it has the power and means to fulfill its goals.  Therefore, 
connecting sovereign power and the law to the rule of the strongest is problematic for Derrida, 
because the order of the strongest prevails through force of law and violence.  
Derrida’s analysis supports the position of this paper that concepts such as sovereignty 
and law are fundamentally problematic.  These concepts ensure protection of civilians as much as 
they ensure the violation of their rights, if the occasion is deemed to warrant it.  Ultimately, the 
state ensures its survival and imposes its will through violence if necessary.  Under current U.S. 
emergency rule, the existence of some can be precarious; particularly, Arabs, Muslims and/or 
those that resemble the physical and/or cultural characteristics of said groups.  The latter groups 
are vulnerable to rendition, detention, violence, torture, deportation and so forth.  On a global 
level, countries such as Afghanistan and Iraq are subject to U.S. military aggression.  
Derrida is critical of the way the United States exploits the notion of rogue.  The United 
States denounces a rogue state when that state disregards domestic and international law.  A 
rogue state is one that assaults its civilians and engages in activities that exalt existing tensions 
between dominant and subordinate groups stratified through race, gender, sexual orientation and 
so on.  By this very standard, Derrida argues, the United States and its allies are rogue states 
(Derrida 2005: 102).  Derrida however, is not necessarily concerned about who the rogue states 
are; he is more concerned with exposing how the reason of strongest prevails and how it is able to 
apply conceptual standards of a rogue state unilaterally.  In this way, one can contextualize 
sovereign power on a hierarchy; the strongest state is able to denounce another state as “rogue,” 
while not applying the same standards to its own practices and activities.  Another point Derrida 
emphasizes is his concern on sovereignty itself, and the extent that, sovereignty can transform 
into a rogue state if the conditions warrant it or to establish its rule.  Derrida writes, “As soon as 
there is sovereignty, there is abuse of power and a rogue state” (Derrida 2005: 102).  . 
 Notwithstanding the political, economic and social sanctions that targeted groups or 
nation states experience by the reason of the strongest, Derrida warns that the rule and reason of 
the strongest is curtailed by that which it aims to subdue or obliterate.  Derrida refers to the 
practices and strategies of the strongest as being ‘autoimmune.’  Derrida writes “A living being 
can spontaneously destroy, in an autonomous fashion, the very thing within it that is supposed to 
protect it against the other, to immunize it against the aggressive intrusion of the other” (Derrida 
2005: 123).  We can infer from this perspective that the practices, policies and strategies of the 
strongest will result in intensifying Anti-American attitudes.  Aggravating widespread hatred of 
the U.S. can be exploited by terrorist networks to recruit and deploy individuals to commit 
terrorist activities.   
The essay to this point has developed an inclusive and expansive understanding of the 
state and law in the context of a state of exception.  Indeed, consolidating all theories provide us 
with multiple perspectives on how power works in relation to sovereignty and law under 
emergency rule.  On the one hand, one of the more disturbing features of this interplay of 
sovereignty and law under emergency rule is its connection to life (in general) and the production 
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of bare life (in particular).  The latter speaks to a lager concern of this inquiry, which is the power 
the state has to produce bare life; the production of bare life is part and parcel of the sovereign’s 
capacity to restore or maintain order.  On the other hand, and equally disturbing, is the interplay 
of sovereignty and law also has the power to produce rogue states.  Stronger states are able wage 
war against rogue states, stronger states are also able to enforce legal, economic and political 
sanctions on rogue states to restore and/or maintain sociopolitical stability.  With the former and 
latter in mind, one can appreciate the dire implications for targeted groups or nation states.  For 
example, South East Asians, Muslims, Arabs or those that resemble their physical characteristics; 
in terms of nation states, Afghanistan and Iraq are facing U.S. military aggression.  
 
Section Three: The State, law and life 
 
This essay now returns to the case of Mr. Arar.  The case of Mr. Arar illustrates Agamben’s key 
concepts of homo sacer, the ban and the camp.  Although Mr. Arar was not killed, he was 
removed from legal jurisdiction, which, under normal legal order, would afford him protection.  
Individuals responsible for his removal, torture and abuse were not punished for their actions.  
Mr. Arar’s case demonstrates how life under emergency rule can be exposed to an unfettered 
capacity to be detained, removed, tortured and abandoned by domestic and international law.  Mr. 
Arar’s case also highlights the control the state has over life, death and its ability to deny targeted 
bodies from legal protection. Specifically, it shows how in times of crisis, an individual deemed 
homo sacer (in this case, Mr. Arar) is excluded from legal protection; his/her lives are politicized 
and rendered exceptional; consequently, the sovereign has power over life and death (Agamben 
1998: 90). 
 Agamben’s concept of the ban also applies to Mr. Arar. Agamben theorizes that someone 
who is banned is isolated and at the whim of the sovereign power that abandoned it.  Someone 
who is banned is therefore excluded from normal juridical order, and is inserted into a zone of 
exception (Agamben 1998: 110).  To contextualize Agamben’s analysis to Mr. Arar’s case, one 
can infer how Mr. Arar was stripped of legal protection (domestic/international); and was 
forcefully removed in secrecy from JFK airport to Syria.  Once he was in Syria, he was captured 
by interested personnel who unremittingly tortured him. 
 Agamben’s concept of the camp is also relevant to the case of Mr. Arar.  The camp is the 
open space, which emerges under a state of exception, it is a zone in which the rule of law is 
suspended; what transpires in the camp is left to the discretion of the agents operating in the 
camp.  Mr. Arar was in multiple camps; first when he was detained at JFK airport, where it is 
alleged that he was interrogated aggressively by U.S. intelligence; second, when he was in Syria.  
More broadly, the latter demonstrates the ubiquity and normalcy of the camp in modern civil 
societies (Agamben 1998: 175).   
Mr. Arar’s case is not an anomaly; other Canadian citizens have shared a similar fate. 
None of these individuals have been found guilty of any association with a terrorist network.  The 
following are the names of other homo sacer’s: Abdullah Almaki, Ahmad El Maati, Muayyed 
Nureddin. All these men claim they were shipped to countries like Syria to be tortured (CBC 
News. www.cbc.ca/news/background/arar/torture-claims.html).  The Canadian government may 
be trying to protect the nation from a terrorist attack.  However, its methods are problematic 
because too many innocent people are embodying homo sacer; they are banned and shipped to 
camps around the world where they are tortured, interrogated, removed from their normal life and 
denied due process.  
Although these four men are now in Canada, they are psychologically damaged. 
Traveling means something different to these individuals who have been detained and shipped to 
a country to be tortured.  Despite the fact that the Canadian government was forced to give Mr. 
Arar $10 million in compensation, this does not rectify the injustice done to him.  Mr. Arar’s 
name has not been cleared from U.S. intelligence. As a result, the Arar inquiry has developed 
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seven recommendations to avoid making the same mistakes as the RCMP and CSIS did with Mr. 
Arar, Mr. Almaki, Mr. El Maati and Mr. Nureddin.  The latter discussion has looked at several of 
the political and legal transformations in the Canadian state post 9/11.  Agamben’s theoretical 
concepts were applied to the empirical case of Mr. Arar3.  
Employing Agamben’s conceptual framework to the case of Mr. Arar has dire 
implications in terms of the relationship of state control over life.  Under emergency rule, the 
state can render someone to be the exception and therefore ban the individual in question.  The 
banned individual is stripped of all rights and is reduced to mere biological life.  This process of 
reducing someone to mere biological life enables the state to do anything against this person, 
including rendering them to a camp in a foreign country, indefinite imprisonment, torture or 
death.  The power the state has to render someone the exception is directly connected to the 
state’s will to ward off threats.  The state’s ability to exclude someone from the normal juridical 
order and insert them into the realm of exception is part of a wider sociopolitical strategy the state 
can use to restore or maintain order.  Perhaps more disturbing however, is that all subjects have 
the potential of being rendered the exception by the state if the material and discursive conditions 
warrant it. Agamben persuasively points out the latter to be the necessary constitution of modern 
sovereignty.  
It is useful to return to Derrida’s analysis of sovereignty; specifically in terms of its logic 
and power.  The logic of ipseity can be applied to better our understanding of the power the state 
has to produce rogue states.  As such, under emergency rule, the state has the ability to resort to 
military and police repression; it has the ability to suspend the law, and wage war against 
designated ‘enemy states.’  According to Derrida’s analytic tools, the ‘strongest’ state can do this 
precisely because it has the power and means to do so.  It is useful to put into perspective the 
interplay of “voyou” and ipseity. The latter reveals the power the state has to designate the label 
of “voyou,” to targeted rogue states and domestic targeted groups.  The power of being able to 
identify the voyou sets up a situation whereby the voyou must be dealt with in order to restore or 
sustain sociopolitical stability.  Therefore, the labeling of voyou enables the ‘strongest’ state to 
wage war, to employ practices of rendition and subject designated enemies to deportation, 
detention, torture and death.  
 
Conclusion 
 
From the perspectives of Hobbes and Locke the formation of the state and law was imperative to 
improve the living conditions of humans—it was also a means to safeguard their lifestyle and 
property.  Here, one can appreciate how the context of the state of nature led to the formation of 
the state and law.  For these two intellectuals, the state and law embodies a protective role and it 
represents the will of the common.  
Scholars such as Schmitt, Foucault, Agamben and Derrida challenge this so called 
protective role of the state.  For them, during times of emergencies, the state is able to breach its 
mandate of protection and it uses military and police apparatuses to establish or sustain order; the 
latter is legitimized through the law.  This literature review synthesized the multiple roles of the 
state and law and showed how external circumstances shape the modus operandi of the state and 
law.  This essay aimed to dispel the liberal views which distinguish the normal juridical order 
from a state of exception; as I have shown, both are characteristics of the state and law.  In this 
way, I have provided an inclusive and expansive framework to capture the complex role of the 
state and law under a perceived crisis.  
This essay demonstrated the role and mandate of the Canadian state and law after 9/11.  
The case of Mr. Arar was used to contextualize the discursive and material practices of the 
Canadian state.  The case of Mr, Arar is a snap shot of a wider project of extraordinary rendition 
and detainees in camps all over the world.  The practices of the state under emergency rule 
demand an interrogation on the practices of extraordinary rendition, control over life, production 
International Journal of Criminology and Sociological Theory, Vol. 1, No. 2, December 2008, 128-141 
 139 
of rogue states and the ubiquity and normalcy of the camp.  However, more broadly, it demands 
further interrogation of the constitution of modern sovereignty.  
  
Appendix A 
  
Excerpts from the Report of the Events Relating to Maher Arar 
 
 That CSIS examine its agreements and policies with the RCMP to determine whether 
they provide the necessary protection against third-party disclosure, while still 
recognizing the importance of information sharing between the two organizations; 
 That the O’Connor Commission determine whether the RCMP shared CSIS obtained 
information with American agencies; 
 That CSIS amend an operational policy in relation to foreign travel proposals including 
human rights concerns;  
 That CSIS amend an operational policy to require consideration of human rights issues 
when seeking to use information for targeting approval; 
 That SLOs maintain written records when requests for information are transmitted to 
foreign intelligence agencies and that formal letters be sent to confirm verbal requests; 
 That CSIS identify an effective means of prioritizing sensitive requests to their 
Washington SLOs, and explore ways to reduce delays when seeking information from 
U.S agencies; 
 That CSIS examine its practices relating to the receipt, prioritization, and review of 
RCMP reports to ensure more timely identification of time-sensitive or important 
information. 
 
Source: “The Report of the Events Relating to Maher Arar” Government of Canada, 2006: 550. 
 
 
Note: The preceding recommendations have been crafted to improve better awareness about 
countries; particularly those that are likely to engage in practices of torture.  In this way, the 
recommendation hopes to prevent detainees from being tortured or interrogated (recommendation 
#3 & 4).  Recommendation five and six emphasizes effective and efficient communication among 
various intelligence agencies particularly, when it concerns the whereabouts of a detainee. 
Recommendation five and six also proposes that intelligence agencies respond to each other in a 
timely fashion –meaning that they prioritize sensitive cases. 
 
Endnotes 
                                                 
1 Thomas Hobbes uses the term “man” to refer to a male leader, which reigns in the Leviathan (state). 
2 Thomas Hobbes uses the term “men” or males, to refer to those that embody the Leviathan (state). 
3 The recommendations by the Arar inquiry can be viewed in appendix A.  The aim of the review in this 
section is to show the urgency to rethink notions pertaining to the nation state and the law in the context of 
post 9/11.   
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